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Measuring Development - from the UN’s perspective  
Mary S. Morgan (LSE) and Maria Bach (KCL) 
Corresponding author: m.morgan@lse.ac.uk  
Never again should it be possible to say ‘we didn’t know’. No one should be invisible. This is the 
world we want – a world that counts. 
- A World that Counts, 2014, 3 
 
Abstract 
Recipes for creating development have changed radically since the international 
community first thought to intervene in such historical processes soon after WWII. 
During this time, views about how to measure development have also changed 
dramatically, moving from relatively simple to relatively complex measurement 
systems. This paper charts these changes using both the oral interview histories and 
retrospective book accounts given by those involved with the UNDP, and offers an 
analysis of their ‘political economy of numbers’. Their move from using GNP per 
head to the SDGs is analysed in terms of the potential performativity of those 
numbers in prompting development and for creating accountability 
 
A World That Counts, a November 2014 report prepared for the UN, was programmatic in its 
commitment to numbers and to counting. Its significance at that moment was to point to a 
double sense of what counts. People count - ‘no one should be invisible’ in this new world - 
but the world itself should also count, for this document on numbers was written as a 
commitment to the prosecution of the then forthcoming Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). It is not difficult to argue that the UN’s development project always involved 
regimes of counting, but the scale of the numerical regime envisaged in the SDGs is 
unprecedented, if not amazing. From an organisation that privileged a single measurement of 
development, the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1990, it became one supporting the 
call for 230 or so indicators of development in 2015. This paper aims to unravel the UN’s 
engagement with ‘development’ by offering a commentary that thinks seriously about its 
‘political economy of numbers’ (Seers 1976): namely how the economic things we count, and 
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 2 
the way we count them, have political implications for economic actions around the world’s 
economies. We concentrate on how the UN organisation and its people thought about the 
problem of creating numbers of development that could be used for different purposes and by 
different groups. We intend to be careful in our terminology, for the words: numbers, 
counting, and accounting; and measurements and measuring, are all associated with different 
usages and implications. We also need ‘indicators’ - numbers that indicate but are not direct 
measurements of something (as we find in business cycle indicators for example). Numbers 
are also often connected to specific ‘targets’ and ‘goals’, another terminology of development 
agendas that weave throughout that UN history even while there are substantive changes in 
ambition.  
 We are going to present our materials by intertwining two different commentaries. In 
one commentary, we depend upon a set of historiographical resources created by the UN 
Intellectual History Project (UNIHP). This project, established in 1999, was set up as an 
independent initiative by the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies of the City 
University of New York (CUNY) and consisted of a set of edited books written by people 
who had been committed to the UN over long periods, and 76 oral history interviews of those 
involved with the UN that have been transcribed and made searchable. These do not 
constitute an ‘official’ institutional history, yet at the same time, they offer a set of sources 
with a potentially high degree of internalism. To counteract that internalist tendency, we will 
offer a ‘between their lines’ reading to abstract these UN people’s thinking about numbers 
and their use of those numbers. Since their project was undertaken in the period 1999-2007 or 
so, it starts with personal experience, but as their accounts reach back in time, they become 
less personal reminiscences and more a mixture of inherited memory and recorded history.  
Of course, as we know, the UN was not acting alone in this history of development 
numbers: many other agencies, and people, were involved. So, in concentrating on these UN 
sources we are not trying to claim dominance for the UN, nor write out any alternative and 
complementary histories. Nor are we trying to produce a broader history of development or 
its counting regimes. Rather we are trying to capture an internal picture of how those 
involved in this important actor-institution understood their own history of what they had 




Lost and found: UN peoples’ history of development numbers 
One of the immediately striking aspects of this UN history is their preference to mark out 
time changes in neat decades as found in one of the most relevant books in the series: 
Chapter titles for UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice  
(Jolly, Emmerij, Ghia and Lapeyre 2004) 
1940s and 50s: Foundations of UN Development Thinking and Practice  
1960s: The UN Development Decade: Mobilizing for Development 
1970s: Equity in Development 
1980s: Losing Control and Marginalizing the Poorest 
1990s: Rediscovering a Human Vision 
In this, and their other books, we see a long-term commitment to development, but one that 
reflects different notions of it, and portrays their changes of heart about the scope and 
meaning of that term, and their feelings of success and failure. Going back to the 1940s and 
50s, the focus of development thinking is shown in terms of typical macroeconomic problems 
as perceived from Western ‘developed’ eyes of that period: growth rates, employment, and 
the reconstruction of war economies. The 1960s was understood as the decade of ‘planning’ 
development. Development did not just happen, nor was it the result of simple recipes: it had 
to be planned, but those plans understood it as a growth project along normal lines, and 
through standard stages.1 The 1970s are remembered for their attempt to broaden the idea of 
development in the collection of multiple indicators to bring the ‘human and social’ into the 
development mix. And at the same time their agenda began to focus on countries at different 
‘degrees’ of development (e.g. ‘least developed’). This flowering of the 1970s agenda wilted 
in the 1980s when it lost leadership to ‘the Bretton Woods Institutions’ (meaning the IMF 
and World Bank) in the competition for donors, and those institutions’ structural adjustment 
approach to development. The 1990s and 2000s are portrayed as rediscovering the human and 
social agenda, re-establishing a progressive path, and making initiatives at the global level.2  
                                                 
1
 The idea of ‘stages’ had much to do with the popularity of Rostow’s historical account (see Gilman, this 
volume). 
2
 Different agencies had different meanings for the term development, but what was especially disadvantageous 
to UNDP was that it struggled to translate its policy language into monetary support - a resource only the 
World Bank and the IMF had (Doyle 2004, 26). 
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 These books offer historically respectable accounts in presenting their moves along 
the development path as messy rather than glorious, with steps back and loss of focus and 
leadership, as well as moves forwards. They are more obviously faintly Whiggish when they 
reach the present, where they exhibit a natural tendency to stand at their endpoint in the 
middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century and look back over their histories in 
judgement upon their success. At this point, their perspective naturally tends to bring all the 
separate agencies of the UN development goals and targets together - all paths do lead to the 
present, even if they meandered on the way. 
 These histories of the UN also tell us about numerous separate UN initiatives under 
different labels and by several agencies directly or indirectly part of the UN. These are 
presented in their accounts as gradually coalescing into the wider development programme as 
they now understand it. Yet, we can see in this history that the current discourse of goals and 
targets spelt out in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and SDGs shows 
considerable continuity with the earlier UN discourse of ‘goals’ and ‘targets’. Such goals 
were individually set, and pursued with success measured according to targets set in separate 
actions: e.g. health goals and targets, education goals and targets, etc., by UNESCO, 
UNICEF, FAO, WHO, UNCTAD, etc., along with more recent ones on the environment. As 
the development agenda broadened beyond the economic into the human and social, each of 
these individual targets that had earlier been conceived as a set of independent UN projects of 
achieving ‘good things’ in the world, became gathered under the notion of what it meant to 
be developed with the aim that processes of acquiring these characteristics were to be 
embedded internally into each country’s own agenda. A developed country became 
committed, for example, to universal education, and the health services to achieve low infant 
and maternal mortality, and even to a good statistics office and trusted numbers.3 It is difficult 
perhaps to recover this difference. When Richard Jolly interviewed Hans Singer, he suggests 
that (with the MDGs) the UN seemed to have returned to the old targets of child mortality, 
education or life expectancy. But Singer explained the difference between the old social 
indicators (of the 1970s, which we come to below) and the ones included in the MDGs: “But 
even though we now use those targets and give a lot of attention to them, we are not so much 
                                                 
3
 Stone comments that Samoa seems to have been included in a list of underdeveloped nations because “the very 
fact that some of their main statistics are missing is itself proof that it is a least developed country” 
(Stone 2002, 53). 
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emphasizing them as social sector targets but as indicators for the whole process of 
development” (Singer 2000, 135).  
 Two decades are particularly relevant to our concern with numbers: the 1970s and 
1990s. These UN histories treat the 1970s as a key decade in the context of the current 
thinking about development in a number of respects. There was first the change from 
assuming there was one economic development recipe and path, to seeing several, with 
categories of relative development, and different paths appropriate for different situations. 
This variety in itself required the creation of relevant sets of measurements appropriate for 
different levels of development (Ward, 2004). But it was also the decade which saw “the 
most important effort to re-think the numbers and to re-think what we meant by success and 
by development itself and to play down the previous emphasis on GNP and GNP growth” 
(Helleiner 2000, 39) and to focus on the “good life for human beings as the purpose of 
development” (Singer 2000, 128). This broadening of the agenda beyond the narrow 
economic focus was associated with serious investigation into the use of indicators and index 
numbers. Under the leadership of Tinbergen, the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD) developed a “composite and synthetic set of [18] development 
indicators” and “provided the most comprehensive common coverage ... about the general 
well-being of societies”. While this was regarded as “technically sophisticated” it was also 
seen as “too complex and insufficiently transparent” to know exactly what it was measuring, 
or to be useful in policy work (all quotes Ward 2004, 159-60).4 This broadening of the notion 
of development and the collection of indicator numbers in these years was not just an 
initiative of the UN, but was more widely shared, for example by the World Bank.  
 Ward’s (2004) account of quantification at the UN contrasted this 1970s moment with 
that of the early 1950s. As he argues it, the UN charter requires it to promote “higher 
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development” (Article 55) but it cannot interfere in member countries. In this Cold War 
context, there were worries about social measurements being  
seen as the Secretariat making political ‘judgements’ about member governments, especially 
because an early intention was to quantify ‘development’ and create an ordinal listing of 
countries along relevant common scales appropriate to selected social indicators. (Ward 2004, 
                                                 
4
 The UNRISD was created in 1963 with Tinbergen and Myrdal to construct social indicators on which 
UNRISD worked for 15-20 years (Ghai 2001, 80). 
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143) 
These UN sources portray their project for development and its relevant numbers opening 
and widening in the decades from the 1950s to 1970s decades, but then they see these 
avenues and numbers closing down during the 1980s; the 1990s changes are recognised as a 
new starting point. As Ghai asserted: 
we now see development as a much more complex affair then it was thought of in the early 
post-war decades. Development has many dimensions. The very objectives of development 
are multifold. It is not GDP (gross domestic product). It is not industrialization. It is a lot 
more complicated. (2001, 79) 
 We turn now to this most recent time. The SDGs were introduced in September 2015 
and are beyond the period covered by the UN histories, but as the UN websites portray them, 
they are regarded as a much broader (and so ‘better’) version of the MDGs of 2000, out of 
which they grew and which are very much within this UN project’s historical time period. 
The SDGs set 17 goals, broadening the 8 goals of the MDGs by including the sustainable 
world along with the social and human elements. Both systems grew out of the 1990s move 
to see development as multidimensional in aspect, to be treated as a set of characteristics of 
what it meant to be developed. For example, while the MDGs’ most important associated 
slogan was ‘make poverty history’ this was only one of those millennium goals. Each goal 
was associated with a set of targets and since development in this multi-dimensional sense 
could not be measured directly, numerical ‘indicators’ were developed for each of the targets. 
This multi-dimensionality was seen as an improvement on, but growing out of, the much 
more limited HDI of 1990, which involved just three indicators (with no goals or targets). 
 The HDI index numbers of the 1990s were, in their turn, seen in these UN histories as 
signalling a radical break with the past - indicating a rethinking of what development is, not 
just a replacement for earlier growth numbers (i.e. GDP). The HDI, dating from 1990, is 
made up of three indicators: national income per capita, infant mortality and basic education, 
equally weighted into a single index number for each country in each time period. As the 
sources report: Jolly and Sen eventually agreed with Mahbub that they “needed something 
equally vulgar to GDP in order to displace GDP per capita from its pre-eminence as the 
indicator of development” (Jolly 2005, 126). As Sen states, Mahbub was out “to get GNP” 
and the only way to do so was to develop “another similarly simple index” (Sen 2003, 24) 
and that was “better in the sense that it will focus on human lives, and not just on 
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commodities” (ibid). Looking backward with these UN people: “the HDI was a bold 
departure … that challenged political ideologies”. Their new approach “entered into what 
previously had been forbidden measurement territory … and invaded the political comfort 
zone of many national leaders” and “orthodox statisticians” (Ward 2004).  
Reading between, across and beyond their lines  
We see, in these historical resources, a wealth of references to numbers, in all sorts of forms 
and contexts. First and foremost, we observe a wavering commitment: to thick bundles of 
numbers that imply a dis-aggregated view of what constituted development in oscillation with 
thin (or ‘vulgar’) numbers that provide aggregate measurements such as the HDI or GNP per 
capita. (The HDI is also of course a mini-bundle, but is found aggregated into a single index 
number.) These attempts to capture development in simple versus complex numerical 
measures changed as the idea or concept of development changed, and along with the recipes 
advanced to achieve such change. And the purposes of these numbers changed as different 
agencies within and beyond the UN took the lead, and as economics lost its battles for 
dominance to social and human dimensions in the definition of development. Thus, there 
were false starts to both thin and thick measurements, even while a positive ambition of 
‘development’ remains salient.  
 Second, politics matters: numbering systems changed also with national governments’ 
desire and ability to limit the range of targets thought to be associated with development in 
contrast to the UN peoples’ desire to broaden that agenda.5 And of course much depended on 
the ability of development ‘interests’ inside the UN to force their agenda to the fore amongst 
the UN’s other agendas. Several interviewees discussed the struggle to change the existing 
framework or ideas. The best way seemed to be “to understand the way Security Council 
members were thinking and then articulate new ideas whereby they could make linkages 
quickly and absorb that which is new” (Heyzer 2002, 46)].6 There was a similar set of 
constraints and battles in the way that the UN development organisations operated against (or 
in conjunction with) alternative powerful agencies in the development industry. Interviewed 
in 2004, Doyle suggested that the IMF, World Bank and the UN had now decided on writing 
                                                 
5
 For instance, a joint project by UNESCO and UNRISD on the interaction between culture and development 
worried UNESCO because it could be too controversial, and was eventually abandoned (Ghai 2001, 89).  
6
 For example, Heyzer explains how his team had to argue that female violence should be a priority in the 
Security Council by framing it as a “good indicator of human security” (2002, 46).  
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reports that prove that they are all on the same page. “We’ve agreed to measure progress 
now” (Doyle 2004, 26). As a result, Sadik describes the overall framework for development 
at the country level as  
an umbrella objective as the objective or the main goal, and then showing how the objective, 
or the core programs of the different organizations would help to achieve that objective. Also, 
we developed a whole set of procedures on country assessments and common data systems 
and so on. (Sadik 2002, 168) 
 Third, numbers are seen neither as an independent issue, nor merely a technical 
problem. Research and annual reports and data innovations prompted each other. As Streeten 
argued, their Human Development Reports made the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) a high profile agency in terms of generating ideas (whereas it used to be 
low profile), because it triggered some very important discussions and actions (Streeten 2001, 
53). At the same time, the UNDP people were keenly aware of the competition between 
different defining measures. We already saw the battle between GNP per head vs. the HDI, 
but the HDI was also in competition with the World Bank’s $-a-day measure. These different 
measurement systems marked competition between agencies, but also between measurement 
systems that capture different kinds of things. Sadik discussed the conflict between UN 
agencies because of their need to fundraise based on the performance and results of their 
particular cause: “So there was a need to bring them together with a common platform. ... The 
experts came in and helped define targets to meet the goals and then indicators.” (Doyle 
2004, 26) At the same time, as the number of indicators grew, responsibility for their 
definition also became diffused beyond the agency, not just to partner research institutes, or 
even national member agencies, but to a variety of highly specialist technical groups, often 
autonomous and sometimes activist NGO groups, who came to feel that they ‘owned’ the 
indicators even once adopted by the UN statistical office.7 
 We can see many of these elements at work in the contrast over the past quarter of a 
century between the HDI, the MDGs and SDGs, and in the movements over time between 
these systems of measuring the characteristics of development. It is important to understand 
that there are two related changes going on here that are rarely separated out.  
                                                 
7
 Doyle (2004, 26) explains how Ph.Ds in statistics and development economics were brought in to construct 47 
indicators (though the eventual number was in fact 60); see also footnote 9. 
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 The first major change is the considerable extension of scope of goals to go beyond 
the social and health to expand substantially the environmental, but also to put back the 
economic aspects that are, perhaps surprisingly, missing from the MDGs. But when the 2015 
SDGs brought back economic they did so not as a recipe for growth, or even as growth itself, 
but rather in terms of the preferred characteristics of the economic elements that should be 
involved in developmental changes (e.g. good jobs, clean cities, etc.). Similarly, the initial 
battle of the HDI versus GNP denoted a replacement of an economic growth recipe for 
creating development by a focus on the associated possibilities of development in social and 
human terms, and not just as a measure of average income to the neglect of poverty. At that 
time, they were particularly concerned with the defect that measures of poverty, in absolute 
terms for part of a population, were not captured in the average income per head (see Sen 
2003, 22).8  
 The HDI was a critical break point here, not just in broadening the scope, nor because 
it provided the starting point for this new way of thinking about development, but because it 
also prompted the commitment to numbering via indicators. We can point to the links in the 
chain towards the MDGs - the HDI was followed by a succession of poverty indexes: first the 
Human Poverty Index (HPI) (1997) and then the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 
(2010), which were supposed to better reflect the deprivation in developing countries (UNDP, 
2006), but were also indices with an increasing number of indicators.9 The 25-year expansion 
in indicators during 1990-2015 is well shown in the ratios involved. The SDGs’17 goals are 
to be met by concentrating on 169 targets associated with 230 indicators compared to the 8 
goals of the MDGs with 21 targets and 60 indicators, and the mere 3 indicators for the HDI 
producing a single index number. Or seen more clearly in terms of the ratio of 
goals:indicators: HDI is 1:3; MDGs are 8:60 and SDGs are 17:230.  
 The second major change over those years is much less commented upon, and lies in 
the increasing ‘stretch’ between the characteristics of what constitutes a goal, a target, and an 
indicator, and so in the relationship between them. The SDG goals are broad ambitions 
expressed in words (sometimes using quite conceptual terms), the targets also remain to some 
                                                 
8
 Sen explains how in 1989 Mahbub argued they should focus “on the lives of human beings —their freedoms 
and well-being, their capabilities”. Mahbub wanted Sen to help him construct “a powerful weapon” to 
demand “more attention on people's deprivations and unfreedoms.” (Sen 2003, 22) 
9
 These indices were developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) and the 
UNDP together (Alkire and Santos 2010). 
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extent verbally expressed though they were more specific. The numerical indicators are not 
designed to provide numbers directly on how far the goals are met for there is no one-to-one 
relationships between indicators and targets, but rather to provide numbers that could indicate 
(in some relevant way) success in various aspects associated with the characteristics of the 
targets. For example, SDG Goal 1 is to “End poverty in all its forms everywhere” and has 5 
targets with 9 indicators. Target 1.2 is  
By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living 
in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions.  
It does not define ‘dimensions’, but nevertheless is a target for which one can imagine some 
good numerical indicators. By contrast, consider Target 1.5:  
By 2030 build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations, and reduce their 
exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and 
environmental shocks and disasters. 
As with many of the other targets, this one is difficult to characterise with a set of measurable 
characteristics and so indicators. In general, while the numerical indicators have some 
relation to their targets, they are not directly and unambiguously measurements of the 
elements expressed in the targets; and these targets in turn are related to their goals as 
multiple characteristics of those goals. Indicator numbers operate at a twice-removed level in 
relation to goals; they are numbers that indicate, not measure, in relation to goals and they 
function so only indirectly via targets.  
 In contrast to the SDGs, the MDGs goals were much more narrowly specified (for 
example: ‘reduce childhood mortality’, ‘achieve universal primary education’) so that their 
targets could be expressed in measurable terms, and most indicators therefore had a more 
unambiguous relation to their targets, and thus to their goals. This increasing stretch between 
goals and indicators that we find in the SDGs compared to the MDGs is also evidenced by 
the fact that some MDG goals became targets in the SDGs, and that the sheer number of 
indicators in the SDG system means that these numbers operate at a much more granular 
level than in the MDG system. Looking backward, some degree of stretch is also evident in 
the earlier move from the HDI to the MDGs and from GNP/GDP to the HDI. In that first 
step, when the HDI replaced GNP/GDP per capita, we can see that the first small expansion 
of scope (one to three measurements) was also associated with ‘stretch’: but in this case, 
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those three indicators were associated with Sen’s notion of human capabilities, a 
philosophically grounded legitimation of stretch. 
 There are important and underestimated consequences of this expansion of scope in 
conjunction with the increased stretch: namely as the goals expand, the indicator numbers 
have an ever more limited overall representing power not just for individual goals but also 
for development as an overall ‘good’. What do we mean by this? Both MDGs and SDGs 
produced sets of indicators, but they cannot be combined to produce an overall index number 
measurement of development in the way that their HDI predecessor did. To produce an index 
number requires that all the numbers are in commensurable units, and that the weighting, 
which enables them to be spliced into one index number, is based on some principle. The 
HDI was based on equal one-third weights, for no good reason: the choice of weights, and 
elements, were both arbitrary, not principled, as was recognised by its creators (see Sen 2003, 
23-24). To see why this matters, compare this HDI index number with the usual indices of 
economics found in CPI or RPI. These indices are well-founded on principles: the individual 
goods that are measured in commensurable units (money terms) and their individual weights 
in the construction of the index are determined by empirical survey research which gathers 
information on the share of each of those goods in consumer budgets. That is, both the choice 
of the elements and their weights/shares are based on principles derived from definitions of 
household spending. The impossibility, or at least immense problem, of creating an index 
number like the HDI out of the indicators (for the SDG or MDG systems) - until someone can 
have a good principled explanation for the choice of the elements (the indicators) and for 
their shares in what constitutes ‘development’- is a severe limitation.10 And without index 
numbers, there can be no single measurement constructed which would enable comparisons 
over time and over countries of the national achievements on the combined set of goals, or on 
some kind of ‘development’ scale. Index numbers and indicator systems are fundamentally 
different kinds of ‘measuring instruments’, functioning in different ways (see Morgan 2001) 
and with different usages and different powers to represent development.  
 In sum, the individual indicator numbers in both the MDGs and SDGs can hardly 
                                                 
10
 These difficulties may explain why the technicians of the SDGs/MDGs community worry about the sheer 
numbers of indicators in the SDG system (Alkire 2016, Alkire and Santos 2010). An alternative might be 
to apply some kind of clustering techniques, as Boumans and De Marchi (this volume) report for 
Adelman and Morris.  
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provide single measures of development, and may be remote from measuring the goals: they 
are only partial representations of the targets. Yet they are not without considerable potential 
agency to prompt lots of separate policy actions on each of these specific elements relevant 
for each target. We can see the potential agency working even with the historical first step. 
The HDI produced a single and comparable set of numbers for all countries not just with the 
index numbers, but with the basic three indicator elements, which could be compared over 
time and between countries. It was not brilliant for representing development (it was still a 
‘vulgar’ or thin number), but because of its comparability possibilities, it allowed 
commentators and governments to see beyond income per head. “If you abolished the Human 
Development Report, you would need to find some way to keep the Human Development 
Indices, and all that they mean for providing ways for newspapers, media, television, as well 
as textbooks and academic studies, to rank countries in terms of human concerns” (Jolly 
2005, 135). The HDI was also intended to change thinking about what constituted 
development, and to be used in top-down advocacy. Sen explained how countries then started 
competing against each other with the HDI, which Mahbub encouraged. Mahbub also insisted 
on supplying the one lean number (the HDI) with a large number of tables on different 
elements in human life (Sen 2003, 24). 
 Similarly the MDGs and SDGs helped persuade the UN clients (i.e. the developing 
countries) to follow their prescriptions for development and from the UN’s point of view it 
was, and is, important that goals are associated with targets that are monitored via numbers. 
Just as for Tinbergen’s earlier initiative at UNRISD, “we need solid data and social 
indicators. Otherwise, how can we measure social progress?” (Ghai 2001, 80) The UN also 
believes in the need for ranking countries: “Then they had a databank, and they tried to make 
the data comparable so that you can compare the performance of different countries.” (Ghai 
2001, 80) These numbers also prompted bottom-up agenda agitation for action, in line with a 
long UN tradition of encouraging dispersed advocacy, not just from the UN’s local offices 
and national governments, but from local activist levels inside individual countries. Such 
goals also helped to activate the collaboration of other international institutions (the World 
Bank for example, has adopted two of the SDGs for its specific attention). 
Political economy of numbers: Counting, accounting and accountability 
We can see from these sources that numbers really matter, that they have agency inside and 
outside the institution: “There is no way that I can convince anybody to take action unless we 
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have concrete figures” (Tolba 2001, 47). We can find evidence that data set the work 
programme; data provided the means to measure progress and to compare countries; and data 
provided a public instrument of persuasion. The debates may be politicized, but when “it 
comes to identifying the issue, science speaks with its own voice, and people accept this and 
say ‘yes, we need to do action.’” (Tolba 2001, 48) It is perhaps a mark of the privileged 
agency of numbers that these UN people were well aware that their data could be unreliable, 
and even guesstimates, but still serve these purposes equally well.11 Or, to put it into another 
context: they were sophisticated in terms of the sociologists’ ideas of knowledge 
construction, for their experience told them what kind of numbers would convince and 
energise even if not fully accurate or objective. The institutional backing of the UN 
buttressed the public trust in numbers that might not have been backed up by expert 
‘objective’ judgement (Porter 1995).  
 Dudley Seers, one of the most respected participants in the development debates, 
discussed the ‘political economy of numbers’ in an essay of 1976 on the system of national 
accounts. His questions about public and expert attention to development numbers prompts 
us to probe some salient similarities and contrasts between national income accounts and 
these later development numbers for more is involved here than ‘trust’. Seers drew attention 
to the way our regimes of economic numbers shape our perception of the world: 
What appear to be merely technical choices in statistics are in fact often of profound 
importance, because published data mould our perception of reality. We cannot, with our own 
eyes and ears, perceive more than a minute sample of human affairs, even in our own country 
- and a very unrandom sample at that. So we rely on published statistics not merely for 
professional or political (or commercial) purposes, but in order to build and maintain our 
model of the world. (Seers 1973, 193) 
 Trust and perception are both preconditions for something else, namely for agendas of 
audit and accountability. The interesting literature on the sociology of accounting analyses 
how numbers indirectly ‘discipline’ people, institutions, or the state in an international 
environment, to behave in certain ways that would satisfy the targets set in the measuring 
                                                 
11
 As a member of the Planning Commission for Pakistan, Sadik remembers that the WHO did not have 
satisfactory data (Sadik 2002, 37-39). Consequently, Sadik had to plan without much information: “I 
made up all kinds of statistics, which I constructed in some way to reflect infant mortality from general 
mortality, and what percentage were women” (ibid, 39). 
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system (see Power 1997). Miller (1990) discusses the close intersection of such numbering 
systems and the role of the state. Numbers matter not just in the sense that they are associated 
with various kinds of measuring systems, but because they also double in various 
accountability regimes. We see this audit agenda evident in the oral interviews: Shahani 
explained that the Human Development Reports were welcomed “because they show 
governments that there are other indicators of power”. The indicators help the international 
community and the domestic civil society to judge the government: “It’s not just having a 
strong military or having your allies across the oceans or having your own global summits. 
Those days are over” (all quotes Shahani 1999, 49). This agenda was more clearly flagged for 
the future in the A World That Counts report: 
Data are the lifeblood of decision-making and the raw material for accountability. Without 
high-quality data providing the right information on the right things at the right time; 
designing, monitoring and evaluating effective policies becomes almost impossible.  
Those in the UN well understood this audit and accountability regime. Targets were “an 
orienting, disciplining exercise and also a measurement of our success or failure” and showed 
“how difficult the task is.” (Chidzero 2000, 127-8) While a variety of claims for the role of 
numbers are made in these sources, they add up to the idea that accountability can only be 
built through data, or rather that accountability requires the use of some kinds of numbers and 
numerical evidence that either initiates, or assesses, programmes of development or both.  
 We go back to Seers however because he was explicitly dealing with the project of 
numbering the economies for development actions, one in which he was an active participant, 
and because the national income accounts that he discussed were also a UN-owned 
measurement project. Those accounting measurement systems were initially developed in the 
1940s by economists anxious to use the macroeconomics of growth to avoid repeating the 
depression of the 1930s and their standards were established and set in the context of the 
1950s by the UN. The founders of that system (R. Stone and S. Kuznets) had doubts about its 
relevance to developing economies (see Morgan 2011), but these doubts were overruled. 
Seers outlined all the problems of using them as a measuring system for developing 
countries, and the great difficulty of thinking outside this box, which became more evident as 
the notions of development changed. This was indeed the background that we have already 
sketched for the UN’s engagement during those early decades, their subsequent desire to 
broaden the numbering regime in the 1970s, and the replacement of the single number GNP 
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(or GDP, based on national income accounting) with the HDI in 1990. As Seers pointed out, 
these GNP numbers had great influence, they were watched in and outside the public domain, 
but with little understanding of their drawbacks particularly for measuring developing 
countries and when using such numbers to plan or promote or prosecute development 
actions. 
 Seers ended his essay on a hopeful note: “While we should not ask too much of 
official statisticians, national or international, we should expect them to be as flexible and 
imaginative as their predecessors of three or four decades ago.” (1975, 204) The new systems 
of indicator numbers were clearly flexible, and did allow for great imagination on the part of 
the UN and its partners. But, there is one other really significant difference in the new 
systems of indicators compared to the old system of national income accounts, and perhaps 
one of the main reasons that the latter have not been displaced. As a measuring system, the 
new indicator-based systems do not function in any formal way as systems that can be 
reasoned with. As already discussed, there is no set of principles that relate those indicator 
numbers to each other to become a meaningful index. Indeed, it is because there is nothing to 
hold them together, that these indicator system can be as flexible and imaginative as needed. 
But, that same lack of those principles of relationship also means that the indicators cannot be 
used to fashion development plans. To explain by analogy: accounting systems in firms are 
multi-purposed: they enable firms (1) to ‘see’ the monetary interrelations between the 
segments of their firm (e.g. investment in relation to output); and so (2) to use that set of 
relations for planning their future; but such accounting systems also enable the firm (3) to 
hold segments of their firm to account in their performance in a system of ‘audit’. National 
income accounts can be used in a similar three functions.12 Yet, even though these indicator 
systems of numbers do not reveal how development elements interact with each other, and so 
do not provide the machinery to plan such development, they do have the raw materials to 
provide a regime of audit, and perhaps, accountability. With the MDGs and SDGs, big goals 
were laid out, and targets were set, while the audit regime rests on the individual indicators 
not to measure the targets or goals, but to give an account of how far those targets were met 
in terms of their indicator numbers. 
                                                 
12
 See Morgan (2008) for an example of this three-fold use of the national income accounts in the Nigerian 
economy of the 1960s. 
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 While indicators provide a regime of audit, there is a wavering commitment around 
accountability, that is, around who is responsible for what developmental actions and so 
which country can be judged successful or not, and by whom. To ask about accountability is 
to ask who carries out this audit function and so to whom are the actors responsible? Should 
it be individual national governments, individual groups of activists in nations, somewhere in 
the international arena, or even international agencies in collaboration or in competition? 
With the introduction of the HDI, it seemed that one of the ambitions for its introduction was 
that it would create the kind of public notice and so accountability via audit that was hardly 
imaginable in the comparison of simple growth rates undertaken by international agencies. 
That envisaged audit role was even more clearly specified for the MDG and SDG systems. 
As Doyle argued, the target-based framework of MDGs provides the “constitution” and the 
“agreed-upon country framework for development planning” (Doyle 2004, 27). “But it is not 
a street map”, rather it orients the work in the right direction (Chidzero 2000, 128). It creates 
‘the template’ for the World Bank, the IMF, the regional banks, the bilaterals, and UNDP to 
negotiate with a member country about its development strategy and “the template by which 
a country’s development is measured” (Ibid). In this way, targets function as a “disciplining 
instrument” as Nyerere states in his book (Ibid). It is not just that indicator numbers enable 
the public and journalists to access the information, but rather that the public display of such 
numbers is designed to push the agenda from a top-down accountability regime to a bottom-
up one. This bottom-up accountability is certainly the ambition of The World That Counts:  
As the world embarks on an ambitious project to meet new Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), there is an urgent need to mobilise the data revolution for all people and the whole 
planet in order to monitor progress, hold governments accountable and foster sustainable 
development. 
 Of course, such accountability can work from both ends, and probably does, but 
political limits still exist just as they did in the 1950s, stemming from the fact that the UN is 
an organisation of national governments. The historical shifts over the decades have seen 
economic needs become reconceptualised as social and human needs, and thence (almost) as 
‘human rights’ in development terms, but this does not necessarily include the formal 
(political or legal rights) as found in the UN commitment to human rights. For the UN, there 
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